Long live plutonium vitrification!

For those of you tracking the DOE's plutonium disposition program, here we have some proof in writing from the DNFSB that DOE is indeed trying to kill the program to vitrify plutonium pucks (ceramic or glass) in high-level waste. DOE continues to studiously avoid putting anything about this in writing.

We still have no analysis from DOE as to the viability of sending more plutonium to MOX nor any documentation of the technical issues, including criticality risks, of dumping 5 metric tons of plutonium directly into the sludge preparation tanks and then on to the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) high-level waste vitrification facility. As the House Energy & Water subcommittee acted on June 17 on the DOE budget, we should find out soon how MOX (the highest-cost option) fared and if they are playing the role of DOE's puppets in helping kill Pu vitrification (the lowest-cost option).

Tom

http://www.dnfsb.gov/pub_docs/srs/wr_20080411_sr.pdf

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
TO: J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: M. P. Duncan and M. T. Sautman, SRS Site Representatives
SUBJECT: SRS Weekly Report for Week Ending April 11, 2008

Plutonium Disposition Project: On Friday, DOE-SR planned to request approval for a revised CD-IA (Critical Decision) for the Plutonium Disposition Project and to roll a scaled-down 3013 Container Surveillance and Storage Capability Project into the Plutonium Disposition Project. The existing plan was to send 4.1 metric tons (MT) of plutonium to the future Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility, process 2 MT through H-Canyon, and vitrify the remainder at the K-Area Complex. Under the proposed plan, the amount converted to MOX would increase to 7.8 MT and plutonium vitrification at the K-Area Complex would be eliminated. The remaining 5 MT would be sent to H-Canyon and HB-Line for processing, mixed into high-level waste sludge batches at the Tank Farms, converted to glass at the Defense Waste Processing Facility, and sent to the future federal repository.

The proposed approach would establish a stabilization and repackaging capability compliant with DOE-STD-3013. It also includes an upgrade to the K-Area Interim Surveillance vault's ventilation system from safety-significant to safety-class and includes a safety-class ventilation system for a new 3013 storage area. Also of note, the old plan would have increased the K-Area Complex's capability for performing surveillance on 3013 containers from 15 destructive and 40 non-destructive examinations per year to 40 and 100 per year. This enhanced capability would be eliminated under the new plan. The modified project's estimated startup date would be the 3rd quarter of FY2014 with total project cost estimated to be between $300 and $500 million.