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FACT SHEETThe
Global Nuclear Partnership (GNEP) is a major element of the Bush
Administration’s energy policy. Its principal goal is to expand
the world-wide growth of nuclear energy as a means of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions and fostering economic development. Under
the President's plan, the United States and its nuclear partners
would sell power reactors to developing nations who agree not to
pursue technologies that would aid nuclear weapons production,
notably reprocessing and uranium enrichment.
To
sweeten the deal, the United States would take back highly
radioactive spent fuel rods from foreign reactors for recycling in
this country. These foreign reactor wastes, along with spent fuel
from the U.S. reactor fleet, would be reprocessed to reduce the
amount that would be placed in permanent storage deep underground.
Nuclear explosive materials, such as plutonium, would also be
separated and converted to less troublesome isotopes in a new fleet
of advanced burner reactors that would be built at sites throughout
the U.S.
However,
an investigation by Synapse Energy Economics has found that:
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GNEP
is a rushed, ill-conceived, poorly supported and technically and
economically risky expansion and redirection of the nuclear
industry. Several Congressional Committees and Subcommittees have
decried the absence of detailed technical and cost information in
support of the program. None of the technologies and processes
proposed for GNEP current exist in commercially viable applications
and only a few have been demonstrated in large, engineering scale
projects. The
National Academy of Sciences reported in 1996 that the technological
elements of a GNEP-like program would cost as much as $700 billion
and take 150 years to convert nuclear explosive materials. In August
2007, the Academy once again raised critical concerns and
recommended curtailment of DOE’s aggressive efforts to deploy
unproven technologies. DOE has yet to provide any details regarding
long-term costs and definitive timelines. GNEP’s reliance on
reprocessing spent nuclear fuel represents a major break with
longstanding U.S. policy, which for the past few decades has
supported a once-through nuclear fuel cycle.
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Even
if its unproven technologies are shown to be viable, GNEP also has
the potential to inhibit the adoption of more reasonable solutions
to global climate change by diverting resources into an unproven
and, most likely, a prohibitively expensive nuclear option. An
expansion of nuclear power to effectively mitigate greenhouse gas
emissions would be prohibitively expensive and risky, requiring at
least 1,000 reactors over the next 45 years. It also would be an
extremely slow process, taking decades to achieve any reductions in
world CO2 emissions, if, indeed, it ever does. Such a massive expansion of
nuclear power also would divert capital resources from investments
in other faster and more easily deployed alternatives for reducing
world CO2 emissions.
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GNEP
also would increase the danger of nuclear proliferation and the
potential for weapons grade materials falling into the hands of
hostile or unstable nations and terrorist groups. There is no evidence that GNEP actually would reduce the threat of
proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials to other
nations and terrorists. GNEP’s reversal of the U.S. practice
of not reprocessing wastes poses a proliferation threat. Indeed, the
flows and stockpiles of potential nuclear bomb making materials
would actually increase significantly under GNEP. Not only will more
radioactive materials that are less “self-protecting” be
produced under GNEP, but their wide deployment over myriad transport
routes will create additional access points at which these materials
could be intercepted and diverted. (see Figure 1)
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GNEP
will likely worsen the radioactive waste disposal problem and would
also make the United States the dumping ground for nuclear wastes
from the other participating nations. If
nuclear power growth is tripled to mitigate global warming, the
“take back” policy of GNEP would mean that the U.S.
could import enough reactor spent fuel to fill more than a dozen
Yucca Mountain, Nevada repositories. Under the administration’s
plan, highly radioactive strontium-90 and cesium-137 would be
separated for near surface disposal after 300 years –
resulting in the largest source of high-heat radioactivity in the
United States and possibly the world. DOE would be going against the
past 50 years of recommendations by the National Academy of Sciences
that these very wastes be disposed in a deep geological repository.
Thus
far, over the past six years, the Energy department has spent
approximately $756 million for GNEP technologies. In FY 2009, DOE is
requesting $300 million more. However, GNEP still lacks important
details about technical viability, proliferation risks, waste streams
and ultimate life-cycle costs. By contrast, other, more effective
programs have been cut or eliminated, like the DOE’s
weatherization program that effectively reduced energy demand and
greenhouse gas emissions but has been cut in FY 2009 by 300 million
and eliminated.
Figure
1
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